By Mike Bowen, co-author, We Found the Lost Sand Creek Site
We recently began a new blog series covering the claims that allege Sand Creek was a massacre. The first blog covered the claim the Indians were unarmed and the second covered the claim the Indians did not commit any atrocities or depredations before Sand Creek. See part 1 here: IndiansUnarmed See part two here: IndianDepredations
Another claim that alleges Sand Creek was a massacre was that the Indians were camped in a small congested area below the bluff at what is now the National Park Service Sand Creek site and were slaughtered as they awoke and came out of their tipis. This location would have the Indians placed where they could not see an approaching enemy. This claim also suggests the Indians didn’t know where to place a winter camp.
Commanding Officer at Fort Lyon, Major Anthony, said the Indians understood he was not going to negotiate terms of peace with them, so they had no reason to believe they were under the protection of the government while camping on Sand Creek.
“They (the Indians) came in and inquired of me whether I had any authority to make peace with them. They said that they had heard through the Arapahoes that ‘things looked dark’–that was the term they used…I stated to them that I had no authority to make peace with them. That their young men were then out in the field fighting against us, and that I had no authority and no instructions to make any peace with them. I told them they might go back on Sand creek, or between there and the headquarters of the Smoky Hills, and remain there until I received instructions from the department headquarters, from General Curtis; and that in case I did receive any authority to make peace with them I would go right over and let them know it.
I did not state to them that I would give them notice in case we intended to attack them. They went away with that understanding, that in case I received instructions from department headquarters I was to let them know it. But before I did receive any such instructions Colonel Chivington arrived there, and this affair on Sand creek took place,” Major Anthony said (Report on the Conduct of the War, 38 Congress, 2nd session, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1865).
The Indians knew soldiers attacking was a possibility, so they would certainly want to see an enemy coming from a considerable distance.
According to Anthony’s testimony, the Indians said it felt “dark,” meaning terms of peace were not going to be negotiated. It wasn’t a surprise to them either. They were on the warpath during the spring and summer of 1864, months before Sand Creek. They were killing and scalping white settlers, taking captives and holding them hostage, driving off stock belonging to the government and settlers, and terrorizing the people on the plains. That understanding provides another reason they would not camp below that bluff the National Park Service claims they were camped.
“June 3, 1864
Fort Leavenworth
To Colonel Chivington, Denver:
Send out force to crush the Indians that are in open hostility, as requested by Governor Evans.
S. R. Curtis, Major General” (Report on the Conduct of the War, 38 Congress, 2nd session, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1865).
“September 28, 1864
Fort Leavenworth
To Colonel Chivington:
I shall require the bad Indians delivered up; restoration of equal numbers of stock; also hostages to secure. I want no peace till the Indians suffer more…I fear the agent of the Interior Department will be ready to make presents too soon. It is better to chastise before giving anything but a little tobacco to talk over. No peace must be made without my directions.
S. R. Curtis, Major General” (Report on the Conduct of the War, 38 Congress, 2nd session, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1865).
General Curtis ordered Colonel Chivington to “send out force to crush the Indians that are in open hostility,” which was requested by Governor of Colorado Territory John Evans.
We will get into this more in a future blog, but many people believe the Indians retaliated because of immigrants invading land they owned. The Cheyenne and Arapaho never owned any of the land on Sand Creek or anywhere else in that part of Colorado Territory. The Louisiana Purchase of 1803 included about half (eastern half) of what is now the state of Colorado, which became property of the United States. The Cheyenne were not yet in this area, and even if they were, it was the property of France before the Louisiana Purchase. They were also instructed by Major Anthony about the middle of November 1864 to go camp along Sand Creek—the land was not given to them.
The Indians were smart and would have known where to place a winter camp. That bluff would have also kept them from the warmth of the sun, and in late November, they would want to camp where it would be the warmest. From a logical perspective, that location under the NPS bluff doesn’t make sense. That area is on the north side of a windbreak. Even cows are smart enough to gather on the south side of a windbreak during a winter storm.
Any snow below that bluff would take a long time to melt as well. It certainly doesn’t make sense the Indians would want to camp in snow. It was said during the hearings there wasn’t snow on the ground but in the hollows. So there was a snowfall sometime before November 29th, and when it snows, the areas blocked by the sun will obviously remain with snow.
“There was no snow at Sand Creek fight, only in hollows,” George Bent said (Bent to Hyde, 6-9-1905). This would include the area on the north side of that bluff, where the NPS alleges the Indians camped.
The Indians certainly wouldn’t camp where they would not see an approaching enemy, and they also would not camp where it’s the coldest and where snow would remain.
There is an even bigger problem with the alleged massacre location: no period artifacts have been found below that bluff. It’s well documented there were around 700 soldiers at Sand Creek. If each of them fired on average just one bullet, that small area below the bluff would have been littered with 700 bullets. It also would have been littered with cannonball shell fragments, Bormann fuses that ignited the cannonballs, village artifacts including metal cooking utensils, kettle pieces and much more.
By the 1860s, the Cheyenne were using metal arrowheads—they would either trade for them or make them from water barrel hoops. No arrowheads were found at the alleged massacre location.
There is a bend that goes through the area below that NPS bluff and is about ¼ mile long. The NPS claims the village and battle location fits in that small area. In a letter to historian George Hyde, George Bent said the Indian villages were 2-3 miles long (Bent to Hyde, 5-3-1906). One of the reasons for the placement of the Sand Creek historic site is due to a map referred to as the George Bent map and Colonel Chivington saying the village was on the “south branch of the Big Sandy” (Report of The Secretary of War, 39th Congress. 2nd Session Special Orders No. 23). People interpreted Chivington’s comments to mean the bend furthest to the south. The map featured that ¼ mile long bend.
We’ve learned through Sand Creek research that George Bent didn’t make that map, but instead it was made by George Hyde. In multiple letters, Bent would write to Hyde that he had filled in or completed the map Hyde sent him (Bent to Hyde, 4-30-1913). The Hyde/Bent map does not have a legend or any kind of key, so Bent would not have known the bend in the map was only ¼ mile long. Hyde copied the bend from the 1894 U.S.G.S. topo map and had no idea to its size. Bent simply filled in details without having any context to the size of the bend on the map. Had the map included a legend, Bent would have known that bend was too small to hold that big of a village.
The NPS Sand Creek site was settled on without it ever being verified by an eyewitness. However, there were soldiers that wrote about Sand Creek and provided information on what the land looked like where they fought. See chapter six of We Found the Lost Sand Creek Site.
Four veteran soldiers held a reunion in 1908 and met with the attempt of marking the spot where they fought the Indians. They got off the train in Kit Carson and made their way down Sand Creek. It is unknown how far down the creek they went. All four had a different spot picked and could not come to an agreement. They all left unsatisfied.
It’s important to note that in the first few years after the battle, the battlefield area was known. Lt. Bonsall measured the distance of Black Kettle’s village just four years after the Sand Creek fight in 1868. There would have still been burned tipi remains and the village site would be discernible. Bonsall measured six miles from a place called Three Forks to his camp no. 2. Just up from his camp no. 2 he labeled the village site, measuring it at about 2-3 miles long.
Sometime between 1868 and 1950, the NPS site was decided as the spot, without any physical evidence to substantiate it. Bent and Hyde were writing about the map in 1913 (Bent to Hyde 4-30-1913), so it was sometime after that. In 1950 a stone monument was placed on the top of the bluff and another concrete monument was placed at the side of the road by Highway 96, about eight miles away. Stone markers can’t mark the wrong spot, can they?
Maps should always have a legend, so it is unknown why it was accepted without any context to show distances.
Chivington’s remarks about the village location were also misinterpreted. He described the area as, “a place known as Big Bend of the Sandy” and said the fight took place on the “south branch” of the Big Sandy ( Report of The Secretary of War, 39th Congress. 2nd Session Special Orders No. 23). We learned through discovery and research Chivington wasn’t referring to a specific bend. He’s talking about something much different. There were no detailed maps at that time—the land hadn’t been surveyed. See chapter five in our book.
The NPS site was still accepted after multiple failed attempts to find artifacts below that bluff.
From our book, We Found the Lost Sand Creek Site:
Fred Werner, a historian, searched below the bluffs at the traditional site, the Dawson property, for 1860s artifacts. He took his first trip in July 1989. Two colleagues accompanied him, including a retired University of Northern Colorado professor. All three were equipped with metal detectors. They left Greeley and made it to the site on a sweltering July afternoon. After some hunting, they sought shade from a cottonwood tree. They searched until early evening.
“We ranged on both sides of the creek, going both upstream and downstream but ended up with no battle relics,” Werner said.
Werner spent two days on his second trip the following summer in August. His friend, Larry Finnell, accompanied him. Larry operated a metal detector business and found an extensive number of artifacts at the Summit Springs site near Sterling. He obtained his Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees at Colorado State University and worked for thirty years with the Colorado Division of Wildlife. The Jewell County Historical Society Museum in Mankato, Kansas displays his Summit Springs artifacts. On their way, they stopped for breakfast in Limon. Two months earlier, a devastating tornado ravaged the small town.
They each placed the $2 entrance fee in the box by the gate and began metal detecting near the monument in the mid-afternoon.
“We worked a short distance upstream and then also downstream, covering at least forty to fifty yards in width, on both sides of the stream. I’m sorry to say that we found only junk items.”
At a battle scene such as this, some bullets would be expected. “We found no battle artifacts,” Werner said.
For anyone that thinks all of the bullets were picked up over the years, that is certainly not the case. Battle and village artifacts have been found, in the thousands, but not at the alleged massacre location. They were discovered about two miles up the creek from the bluff on private property, by a private citizen.
Chuck Bowen found many different types of artifacts including bullets (fired and unfired), canteen stoppers, soldier buttons, spurs, arrowheads, cannonball shell fragments, Bormann fuses for the cannonballs, kettle fragments, coffee grinder pieces, and much more. Over 4,000 artifacts have been found at the Lost Sand Creek Site.
Bowen found enough artifacts that he had identified many tipi sites and running battle areas, and in October 1998, he and his wife Sheri had their discovery documentation notarized. Their discovery came before the National Park Service had any involvement in Sand Creek. See the notary in chapter seven.
The Bowens’ Sand Creek site discovery is undeniable proof the Indians did not camp below that bluff, but instead, they camped starting over a mile up the creek from there. Most of the village site was located on the Bowen family ranch, and extended up the creek for about 2-3 miles, just as Bent said. The battle areas started on the opposite side of the creek from the village and went in various directions away from the creek.
Not only were the Indians not camped below the NPS bluff or any bluff, they weren’t camped in a congested area. As already stated, George Bent said the village was about 2-3 miles long. Bent’s account is verified by the location of village artifacts, which show the village to extend for about 2-3 miles.
The idea the Indians camped congested together forces the narrative the soldiers rode around the village and killed all of them. A spread out village of over two miles doesn’t fit the narrative—it doesn’t allow for the soldiers to close in and kill all of the Indians. In fact, a spread out village allows the opportunity for most of the Indians to escape or flee. The well-known painting that depicts the soldiers circling around the village and killing the Indians as they came out of their tipis is only from the artist’s imagination—he was not an eyewitness. The artist made that painting over 70 years after Sand Creek, but it’s used as if it were a photograph of the event and has played a big part in telling a false story. The massacre story tugs at the heartstrings, but it’s not a truthful account of the events at Sand Creek.
People will bend themselves like pretzels to tell Sand Creek as a massacre. Some even go further calling it a genocide.
As we’ve discussed in previous blogs, Sand Creek was fighting back—it wasn’t a systematic killing of a group of people to extinguish the Cheyenne and/or the Arapaho Indians. General Curtis clearly saw the atrocities committed by the Indians as acts of war. There were even white scalps found in the tipis in Black Kettle’s village at Sand Creek. See our blog here: WhiteScalps.
The artifacts do not lie, and they tell a clear story of a spread out village and running battle areas that stretch for several miles in various directions. The village and battle sites are also different locations—there was very little fighting in the village.
The idea the Indians at Sand Creek were camped congested together below a bluff is debunked. They were smart people—they knew where to place a winter camp, and they knew they would need to see an approaching enemy from miles away, if necessary. George Bent’s brother, Robert, did something quite remarkable when he led the soldiers to the village. See chapter five of We Found the Lost Sand Creek Site.
The truth about Sand Creek needs to be known. It’s incredible how inaccurately Sand Creek is told by the NPS and others.
If we’re not learning from accurate accounts of history, we’re not learning.
Sand Creek was far from a genocide. Most soldiers called it a fight. Cheyenne Dog Soldier (warrior), George Bent, called it a fight. Major Anthony called it a fight. The massacre moniker came from people who were not there, with the exception of Indian interpreter and trader, John Smith, who had motive after losing his buffalo robes—he vowed to destroy Colonel Chivington. This is all explained further in our book.
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